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ABSTRACT
Since 2003, the European Commission has produced analytical documents to appraise and support 
its proposals included in the annual law programme. These so-called impact assessments (IAs) are 
now quite common in the preparation of legislation in the member states of the European Union.
Previous research has been concerned with the quality of the IAs in terms of evidence-based policy, 
especially in terms of economic analysis and other standards of smart regulation. In this paper, we
move from a different perspective. We draw on the narrative policy analysis literature to explore 
impact assessment as text. We consider a sample of IAs that differ by originating DGs, legal 
instrument, and level of saliency. The findings show that the narrative components of the IA are 
quite prominent in the sample. The Commission may use IA to produce evidence-based policy, but it 
also engages with IA it to provide a presentation of self, to establish EU norms and values, and to 
secure legitimacy via causal plots, doomsday scenarios, and narrative dramatization.
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21.INTRODUCTION
In his review of ‘Theories of the Policy Process’ for the Public Policy Yearbook 2011, Matthew Nowlin 
(2011) puts the Narrative Policy Framework on top of the section on ‘emerging trends’. Although this 
framework has often been associated with post-empirical analysis, following Jones and McBeth 
(2010), Nowlin argues that the framework ‘offers a way for policy scholars to empirically measure
how policy relevant information is transmitted and interpreted by both policy elites and the mass 
public’ (2011: 53, emphasis added). To understand this position, one has to consider that social 
scientists often operate with a social ontology combined with an objective epistemology (Searle 
1995). Granted that entities such as narratives are representations of policy created by social actors, 
and thus have an inter-subjective nature, they can still be examined empirically using an objective 
epistemology. This paper belongs to this conceptual framework.1
Specifically, our aim is to add value to the narrative policy framework by combiningtwo important 
dimensions, that is, discourse (Schmidt 2008) and the presentation of self (Goffman, 1959) and in 
doing so explore the different purposes to which narratives are directed. Let us start with discourse. 
Our take on narratives is enhanced by an analysis of the two forms in which discursive entities 
operate in public policy. As shown by Schmidt (2002, 2008), the discursive aspects of policy-making 
fall in two categories. One is coordinative discourse, that is, how elites use discursive structures 
(narratives in our case), to make sense of reality and coordinate their policy initiatives. The other is 
communicative discourse, that is; how policy narratives are communicated to pressure groups, the 
public and, more generally, the external environment in order to achieve legitimacy for the policy 
choice taken by the elites. In our paper, we explore narratives as tools of discursive coordination 
within a complex organisation like the European Commission, and as communicative tools through 
which policy-makers seek to enhance the plausibility, acceptability and, ultimately, legitimacy for 
their policy proposals.Both in coordinating and communicating policy, elites tend to project a certain 
definition of their identity via the narratives they deploy, most often in terms of the moral and 
normative assumptions behind policy choice. Drawing on Goffman (1959), one can argue that this 
presentation of self occurs when we combine activity at the back and front stages.
Empirically, we are concerned with the IAs produced by the European Commission in the 
preparation of policy proposals. Since 2003, the Commission has used the IA procedure to support 
the policy formulation process in the context of its smart regulation strategy (European Commission 
                                                            
1For more general information on policy narratives see the editors’ introduction to the symposium.
32010). Drawing on a large international experience of using economic analysis to appraise policy 
proposals (Kirkpatrick and Parker 2007, OECD 2009), the Commission is committed to the analysis of 
both legislative and non-legislative proposals via a series of steps described in the impact 
assessment guidelines.2 IAs aredocuments describing a process. Interestingly, the documents are
considered internal preparatory papers – hence they are referenced as SEC rather than COM, to limit 
the options for judicial review of the European Court of Justice. However, they are published online 
when the accompanying proposalsare formally presented by the Commission. The process of 
preparing an IA includes problem definition, the identification of alternative feasible options, 
consultation, economic analysis of the options, and a final choice - regulatory or not. For 
example,the IA may well conclude that a non-binding option is better than a directive. Whist the IA 
of the Commission draws on European and North-American experience with regulatory appraisal, it 
is distinctive in two ways (Meuwese 2008). First, it considers the social and environmental 
dimensions alongside the economic dimension of policy proposals, whilst other systems are 
eminently concerned with one dimension, typically the economic effects or sustainability. Second, 
although it is geared towards the economic analysis of proposals, it differs from the US approach 
because there is no a-priori preference for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as method used to carry out 
economic analysis.
The literature on IA in the EU, and more generally in Europe, is vast (Turnpenny et al. 2009). 
However, most of this literature is limited to two types of research questions:first, the governance 
characteristics of IA, including usages of IA (Nilsson et al. 2008, Radaelli 2010) and, second, the 
trends in the overall quality of IA (Renda 2006, Cecot et al. 2008, Fritsch et al. 2012). Thus, we know 
a good deal about how European CommissionIAs differ from their North American counterparts and 
the role they have in promoting 'rational' or evidence-based policy ideals. But IAs are also an 
important step in policy formulation. Here we focus on this formulation role by conceptualising IAs 
as arguments used to justify a given definition of the policy problem and EU regulatory intervention. 
This leads us to the study of the narrative structure of IAs rather than their economic analysis and 
usages by decision-makers. Specifically, we know decidedly less about the variation that exists 
between the IAs produced in the Commission. Indeed, our null hypothesis is that the IA 
formulaictemplate imposed on all Directorate Generales (DG) has homogenized not only the 
structure but also the IA content. Reasons for that are the presence of a common template 
(guidelines are enforced by the Secretariat General, plus systematic training on IA), the coordinating 
role of the Sec Gen, and the scrutiny role of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB), a regulatory 
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4oversight body assisted by the Secretariat General at the technical level. There has been previous 
research pointing to the institutionalization of IA (Allio 2008, Radaelli and Meuwese 2010, Melloni 
2011) so homogenization could well be the result of institutionalisation.We also know less about the 
political and rhetorical purposes these texts serve.By looking at the narrative structure and content 
of individual IAs, this paper explores thesenarratives astools of advocacy as well as inquiry (echoing 
Toulmin et al 1984: 7).
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we make the case for looking at IA through the 
lenses of discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008) and presentation of self (Goffman 1959). In 
section 2 wethen outline our selection criteria and introduce the data we generated for this project, 
then in section 3 we move to sample and data. In section 4 we present our empirical analysis of the 
data drawn from a sample of IAs. Since this is the first study to consider the narrative dimension of 
IA, one aim of our analysis is to explorethe variability and common features in our sample, rather 
than presenting specific hypotheses to be tested. We conclude with a discussion and suggestions for 
future research, including hypotheses that might usefullybe tested in the future.
2.   IMPACT ASSESSMENT AS NARRATIVE
(Why) should we consider IAsas policy narratives? Our first curiosity is indeed about the existence 
and function of a narrative dimension in IA. The prima facie case for narrative analysis is that the 
Commission uses the IA documents to make the case for its proposals and to show how a given 
conclusion was reached. Thus, in a sense, the IA activity is all about persuading the public that the 
accompanying proposal meets some criteria of evidence-based policy to which the EU is committed. 
But, there are also more specific issues to consider.
The guidelines of the European Commission (2005b, 2009c) explain that all IAs are expected to be 
developed around a common template. The guidelines have an explicit narrative structure. Indeed, 
we can match precisely the steps of the IA, and the features of argumentation and policy narratives 
(Roe 1994, Toulmin 1958). The IA, so the guidelines say, should start with a presentation of what the 
problem is. In terms of Toulmin’s analysis of argumentation, this is the ‘claim’ made by the 
Commission. By identifying a general problem, the Commission makes a given social, environmental, 
economic problem ‘out there’ amenable to human action within the EU policy-making framework. 
According to Roe (1994), this is an essential property of policy narratives.
5The guidelines also specify that the officers should provide evidence supporting problem definition. 
Yet again, this corresponds to Toulmin’s link between the ‘claim’ and the ‘grounds’ or evidence that 
are appealed to as foundation for the ‘claim’ (1958). Further, there is an explicit requirement to 
explain what will happen in absence of EU action – the default option of not intervention. In Roe’s 
narrative framework, the text describing ‘what happens if we do not act together’ is the worst case 
scenario component of the narrative. By explicitly requiring an analysis of the ‘do nothing’ option, 
the guidelines stimulate IA authors to dramatize this scenario, often transforming it in a doomsday 
scenario where particularly bad policy outcomes are evoked in the text. Finally, a good IA should 
describe a wide range of actors and sectors that can be affected by the proposed intervention. This 
is sometimes an aseptic list of those who are going to gain from the EU policy and those who are 
going to incur costs. But, in some cases, the IA transforms this list into something more, that is, 
following a classic template of narratives and causal stories (Stone 1988, Roe 1994, Jones and 
McBeth 2010), proper ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’.
The classic IA document is thus a script with a narrative structure. One more observation is in order: 
The IA script is related to both the frontstage and the backstage. The backstage is reflected in the IAs 
in the sections portraying the coordination of policy among different DGs and policy elites more 
generally. The frontstage is where the IA content is displayed for the wider European public and 
member states. Following Goffman(1959), we suggestthat activity on these stages combine to 
provide certain personae or presentations of selfof the European Commission. This means that 
although, in principle, the process of preparing the assessment should be entirely dedicated to 
evidence-based policy, the Commission, according to this conjecture, can manipulate it to establish 
norms, reiterate beliefs, define the range of acceptable and undesirable actions – in short, 
presenting itself. Different presentations are conceptually possible, from presenting the Brussels-
based bureaucracy as a diligent agent of the European Parliament and the Council to more assertive 
presentations, including the presentation of a Commission directly responsive, if not accountable, to 
the public opinion and the major stakeholders in the EU policy process.
These remarksconcerning the front and the back stages have important connections with the 
discursive dimension of policy narratives. To see this, we need to relate IA to the policy formulation 
process. Before the introduction of the impact assessment process in 2003, policy proposals were 
developed within a given service of the Commission - the DG - subject to inter-service consultation 
and monitoring from the Legal Service and more generally the Secretariat General. Observers in the 
past noted the relative autonomy of the DGs in the preparation of proposals, and the weakness of 
6the Secretariat General in providing robust coordination. Upon completion of their interview 
programme within the Commission, Kassim and Menon (2004: 28) spoke of a ‘collection of baronies’ 
to highlight the relative autonomy of the bureaucratic units, i.e. the DGs in charge of policy 
formulation. The situation has changed with the institutionalization of the impact assessment 
process, as shown by previous studies (Allio 2008, Melloni 2011, Radaelli and Meuwese 2010). This 
process hascomplicated the policy formulation network by introducing a mechanism of discussion 
and deliberation centred uponthe evidence to be gathered and reflected in the IA document – and 
most importantly how the evidence connects with the various options and the final 
recommendation. Radaelli and Meuwese (2010) argue that the different preferences, constituencies 
and organisational cultures of the DGs are in-built into the IA process. DGs may have different ways 
of looking at policy problems. But they have been forced to articulate their opinions in terms of 
evidence, and consequently they have given up some bureaucratic autonomy – to other DGs and to 
the Secretariat General, which has gained in coordination capacity. This leads to a null hypothesis of 
no or limited variation across IA to be contrasted with hypotheses about persisting variation - due to 
organizational culture, or whether a given DG is close to the core of smart regulation within the 
Commission policy or not.
This intense inter-organizational activity in the appraisal of proposal has made the IA process a 
cornerstone of what Vivien Schmidt (2008) calls coordinative discourse, i.e. how elites in a given 
organisation or policy subsystem coordinate their action by using discourse. Tellingly, the IA 
document is finalized together with the proposal agreed by the College of the Commission. Up until 
the last minute, the Commissioners can utilise the IA and the draft proposal (say, a draft directive) to 
coordinate and agree. The scrutiny of the draft IAs by the IAB adds another important element to 
the policy formulation network (Alemanno 2008, European Commission 2012). Practically, this 
means that the Board has an opportunity to insist on the inclusion or exploration of certain issues, 
and steer coordinative discourse in one direction or another.
However, the IA is also an important discursive tool in providing justification and legitimacy for the 
choices made by the Commission. In this sense, the IA speaks to a broader audience, where there 
are both institutional publics like the European Parliament and the Council, and the various 
audiences of stakeholders. According to Schmidt (2008) this is communicative discourse, or the 
legitimising function of a speech or text. In the case of the European Commission, legitimacy is also 
intertwined with issues concerning the legal basis for intervention and the scope for EU action in 
areas where prima facie member states seem more equipped to solve problems.
7To sum up then, IAs can be seen, as it has often been seen in previous research projects, as the 
epitome of evidence-based policymaking. But it can also be examined through the lenses of the 
narrative policy framework. In this section we made the case for a narrative analysis of IA based on 
the structure of the guidelines and the aim to persuade the reader that, although not absent by 
other types of documents, is accentuated in this document. We also argued that the IA may be 
manipulated to provide a presentation of self by the Commission, going beyond evidence-based 
policy into the territory of norms, values and what an organization stands for and cares about. 
Finally, we argued that IA as discourse as a coordinative function as well as communication 
properties.
3.   RESEARCH QUESTIONS,  SAMPLE SELECTION, CODING AND DATA
To recap, our first research aim deals with the existence and purposes of the narrative dimension of 
IA. This leads us to the following research questions: Does evidence on IA show a non-trivial usage of 
narrative structures such as causal plots, doomsday scenarios, dramatization, heroes and villains, 
moral reasons for action and other elements associated with narrative policy analysis (Roe 1994)? In 
relation to this, does the Commission make use of IA for functions other than evidence-based policy, 
specifically manipulation of self and the establishment of norms? How do the IA perform in relation 
to communicative and coordinative discourse? Further, we are interested in the variability across 
cases. Considering that there is a process of institutionalization under way (Radaelli and Meuwese 
2010) and that recent research shows common patterns in the EU IAs (Fritsch et al. 2012), do the IAs 
also look alike in terms of narrative structure? Or does the engagement with the narrative dimension 
vary across cases?
To answer these questions, we need to provide a suitable sample and originate data. The 
Commission experimented with IA in the period 2003-2005 (Allio 2008). After that, the production of 
IAs has become a pretty stable, routine-like feature of policy formulation, not the least thanks to the 
establishment of the IAB tasked with exercising oversight on the quality of the draft assessments 
prepared inside the Commission.
To analyse in-depth a certain number of IAs, we did not want to censor our sample. With this in 
mind, we adopted the following three criteria for inclusion: binding versus non-binding proposals 
(like Communications); low versus high saliency issues; and DGs that historically have been very 
8close to the smart regulation agenda of the EU versus more peripheral DGs, which have either 
contested or have simply been less interested in this agenda (Allio, 2008).This way we control for 
whether the appraisal supports legislation or non-legislative proposals, the politicization of policy 
issues and organizational culture.The combination of these criteria provides eight possible 
combinations in a truth table which drove our selection of cases. In consequence, we have selected 
eight IAs summarised in Table 1:
IAs selected (lead DG, year in which the 
assessment was concluded, reference)
Shorthand name Core DG High saliency Legally binding
Proposal for a regulation concerning trade 
in seal products (ENV, 2008, European 
Commission 2008)
SEALS IA + + +
Communication on a European initiative 
on Alzheimer’s disease and other 
dementias (Health Consumers, 2009, 
European Commission 2009b)
ALZHEIMERS IA + + -
Report on the possibilities of further 
improving the environmental 
characteristics of recreational craft 
engines (ENTR, 2007, European 
Commission 2007a)
RECREATIONAL 
CRAFTS ENGINES IA
+ - -
White paper on sport (EDULCULT, 2007, 
European Commission 2007b)
SPORT IA - - -
Protecting Europe from large scale cyber-
attacks and disruptions: enhancing 
preparedness, security and resilience 
(INFOSOC, 2009, European Commission 
2009a)
CYBER IA + -
Directive on a common consolidated 
corporate tax base (TAXUD, 2011, 
European Commission 2011a)
COMMON TAX IA - - +
Directive on restrictions on the marketing 
of certain measuring devices containing 
mercury (ENTR, 2005, European 
Commission 2005a)
MERCURY IA + - +
Directive on a common system of financial 
transaction tax (TAXUD, 2011, European 
Commission 2011b)
FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTION TAX
- + +
Table 1: Sample selected for empirical analysis
In order to analyse these eight IAs systematically, we developed a scorecard consisting of 23 items 
(see Table 2 below). The first five scorecard items describe the technical features of an IA document, 
namely the European Commission’s SEC code, DGs leading or being involved in the drafting process, 
length of IA including annexes and supporting studies, and the type of envisaged output document. 
18 scorecard items dedicate to the narrative elements of an IA and thereby describe features that 
9we will analyse in more detail below, for example causal plot, heroes and villains, dramatic 
elements, and doomsday scenarios.
Item Definition
ID ID of impact assessment
Lead DG Lead DG
DGs involved DGs other than lead DG involved in preparing impact assessment
Type Legal status of document: communication; white paper; decision; regulation; directive
Length Total length of impact assessment including annexes and other associated studies
Triggered by EP or 
Council
Is there evidence that this policy initiative is a response to EP or Council request to take action?
Problem Nature of the policy problem whose existence and merit for action must be established. Guiding 
questions: What is the problem? How is it defined? By defining the problem in a special way, 
does the Commission rule out other definitions of the problem that are in principle plausible? 
Does the Commission evoke some norms or values in defining the problem one way or another?
Identity Is the European Commission's identity as an organization evoked in the narrative and, if so, how?
Types of evidence Types of evidence used to support the causal claim 
Characters Actors affected by policy intervention. Guiding questions: Who is affected (animals, humans, the 
general public, the producer)? Who is concerned about the issue? Who should speak in this 
story?
Causal plot Presence of a causal plot, from problem definition to policy solution
Heroes and Villains In relation to the policy problem identified, does the impact assessment present heroes and 
villains?
Meta-narrative Presence of a meta-narrative. Guiding question: Does the IA propose a synthesis of different 
narratives?
Metaphors Presence of metaphors in the impact assessment
Conflict Does the RIA acknowledge that there is conflict and disagreement? Does it represent conflict and 
if so how?
Type of support for 
choice
Evidence used to support and justify preferred option
Criteria Criteria use when comparing different options: benefit-cost principle, thresholds of costs, cost-
effectiveness, multi-criteria. Guiding questions: What is the nature of reasoning – qualitative 
(reasoning), quantitative (monetized). What is the status of the evidence – functional or 
decorative to the claim and/or solution?
Dooms Presence of a doomsday scenario. Guiding question: What happens without EU intervention?
Drama Presence of dramatic tension in the text.
Wider questions Does the IA produce questions for EP, Council, national bureaucracies: options or conclusions?
Rebut Presence of statements recognizing the restrictions which may legitimately be applied to the 
claim
Conclusion Concludes with strong policy direction
Genre Ideal-type genre represented by narrative
Table 2: Coding framework
10
In terms of measurement, our coding framework contains three types of items: first, those reporting 
on the presence or absence of a narrative feature, resulting in a simple ‘yes/no’ score; second, those 
presenting information about the presence or absence of a narrative feature (‘yes/no’), supported 
by extensive qualitative evidence such as quotations; and, third, those providing qualitative evidence 
related to specific categories or ideal types (see, for instance, ‘Genre’ or ‘Characters’). 
The eight IAs were coded blind by each of the three authors, resulting in three completed scorecards 
per IA. These scores were subsequently aggregated with a view to produce one master scorecard per 
IA which would then guide the below analysis. Across all cases, we were able to code on average 79 
per cent of variables. However, due to the aggregation of scores into master scorecards we reached 
a coverage of 100 per cent for all IAs. Intercoder reliability was high, with more than 90 per cent; 
cases of conflicting scores were resolved in a discursive process amongst the three co-authors of this 
paper. 
4.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Following Schmidt (2008), we are interested in both the discursive content of narratives and the 
interactive processesin which these ideas and values are shaped, shared and deployed. Specifically, 
the sample of eight IAs were coded with the aim of uncovering narrative content, how this is used in 
the European Commission’s policy construction backstage on the one hand, and communication at 
the front on the other and how these combine to create different Commission personae or 
presentations of self. The findings are summarized in Table 3. Additional information on specific 
narrative items is provided in the Appendix. Even a cursory look at Table 3 shows that the narrative 
dimension of IA is not a monolith - there is variability in the sample, for the basic fact that not all IAs 
engage with narrative policy constructions (the Appendix shows that not all IAs have a causal plot, 
doomsday scenarios and dramatization effects) to specific narrative items. 
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MERCURY2005 RECREATIONAL 
CRAFT 
ENGINES2007
SPORT2007 SEALS2008 ALZHEIMER2009 CYBER2009 COMMON TAX 
BASE2011
FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTION 
TAX2011
ID SEC(2005) 101 SEC(2007) 819 SEC(2007) 932/2 SEC(2008) 2290 SEC(2009) 1040 SEC(2009) 399 SEC(2011) 315 SEC(2011) 1102
Lead DG Environment Enterprise Education and 
culture
Environment Health and 
consumers
Information society 
and media
Taxation and 
customs union
Taxation and 
customs union
DGs 
involved
Lead DG only plus 
SG.
Lead DG only 17 DGs Lead DG only 4 DGs 11 DGs + SG Lead DG only 6 DGs + SG
Type Communication Communication White paper Regulation Communication Communication Directive Directive
Length Long Short Short Long Short Long Long Long
Triggered 
by EP and 
Council
Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No
Problem Health-related Environmental Political
Extending 
regulatory 
competences of the 
Commission
Normative
Respond to 
normative beliefs 
held by European 
citizens
Information base
Lack of 
coordination among 
member states 
when it comes to 
sharing research 
findings and 
information
Security-related
Lack of 
coordination among 
member states
Technical (tax 
barriers)
Political
Lack of 
coordination among 
member states
Identity / 
Presentatio
n of Self
Evidence-based 
organization
Diligent agent
Gentle civilized 
global power 
concerned with 
fairness
Foresightful actor
Evidence-based 
organization
Diligent agent
Evidence-based 
organization
Strategic actor 
looking for policy 
spill-overs
Horizontal 
organization able to 
respond effectively 
on cross-cutting 
issues to an 
Evidence-based 
organization
Diligent agent
Gentle civilized 
global power 
concerned with 
fairness
Evidence-based 
organization
Gentle civilized 
global power 
concerned with 
fairness
Possible repository 
of data and best 
practice
Evidence-based 
organization
Strategic actor able 
to cross over the 
boundaries 
between technical 
and political
Evidence-based 
organization
Gentle civilized 
global power 
concerned with 
fairness
Organization 
oriented to long-
term goals
Evidence-based 
organization
Diligent agent
Custodian of the 
single market
Fairness-oriented
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expectant public 
and stakeholders
Promoting NGOs 
Oriented to new-
cutting edge 
research
Types of 
evidence
Inconclusive 
quantitative 
evidence related to 
health and 
economic impacts
Evidence and 
consultation
No empirical 
evidence yet 
statements making 
the case for a 
political 
commitment of the 
Commission
Qualitative studies, 
many of them non-
scientific, and  
consultation
Values and 
collective 
responsibility
Evidence in support 
of a political 
commitment to 
overcome 
fragmented action 
High number of 
various studies 
aggregated in one 
document
Economic analysis 
and political 
commitment
Characters Consumers, 
artisanal miners, 
producers and 
traders, fishing 
industry, industrial 
sectors such as 
power generation
Industry, 
environmental 
agencies, individual 
firms
Citizens, minors, 
athletes, sport 
NGOs, sport 
federations, 
domestic 
policymakers
Animals, EU 
citizens, non-EU 
citizens, local 
communities, 
hunting countries
Patients and their 
families, NGOs, 
researchers, 
residential care 
staff
Business, citizens, 
public 
administrations
Business firms, 
revenue authorities, 
jobholders
Financial sector, 
revenue authorities, 
different income 
groups 
Causal plot Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Heroes or 
villains
No No Yes
Hero: European 
Commission 
responding to 
public and 
stakeholders
Villains: criminals 
encouraging doping
Yes
Heroes: sentient 
seals
Villains: countries 
with weak 
enforcement and 
training or with 
insufficient data 
Yes
Heroes: patients, 
their families, 
carers, researchers
Villains: Alzheimers; 
time
Yes
Hero: European 
Commission
Villains: those who 
perpetrate attacks
Yes
Hero: European 
Commission has 
identified problem 
long time ago
Yes
Hero: European 
Commission 
protecting single 
market and 
handling the 
economic crisis with 
fairness
Villains: greedy 
bankers
Meta-
narrative
No No No Yes
Secondary 
narrative: seal 
hunting as dark, 
mysterious 
business, EU action 
No No No Yes
Main narrative: 
raising income, 
secondary 
narratives focus on 
protecting the 
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is also needed to 
improve our 
knowledge about 
this sector in 
general
single market from 
distortion, 
distributive 
impacts, 
observations on the 
fear of relocation
Metaphors No No No No No Yes Yes No
Expert 
Endorseme
nt
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conflict Yes
Distributional issues
Yes
Different positions 
regarding scope of 
action
No Yes
Distributional 
conflict among 
member states
Yes
Lack of consensus 
on ethical issues
No No Yes
Polarised opinions 
depending on 
affectedness
Type of 
support for 
choice
Economic analyses, 
studies from 
toxicology and 
medicine
Compliance costs, 
environmental 
impact assessments
No empirical 
evidence
Descriptive 
evidence, norms, 
analysis of current 
compliance 
patterns
Norms Economic evidence, 
information 
gathered in 
consultations, case 
studies
Economic analysis 
and consultation
Economic analysis 
Criteria Cost-effectiveness MCA focusing on 
efficiency, 
effectiveness and 
consistency 
including 
compliance costs,
Reasoning informed 
by strategic 
commitment of the 
European 
Commission
Reasoning informed 
by qualitative 
empirical evidence 
and descriptive 
statistics
Qualitative 
reasoning
Qualitative 
reasoning
Maximum net 
benefit in a macro-
economic outlook
Assessments of 
various impacts 
following different 
criteria
Dooms Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drama / 
Emotive
Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No
Temporal 
Urgency
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Wider 
questions
Yes No Yes No No Yes No No
Rebut Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Conclusion No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Genre Handbook for 
problem solving
Homework for 
problem solving
Manifesto Handbook for 
problem solving
Essay on a theme Thriller Handbook for 
problem-solving
Manifesto
Table 3: Summary of Findings
Let us now examine narratives in IA by looking at the interplay between ideas and evidence (section 
4.1.) and the interactive dimensions (section 4.2) where we'll find discursive coordination in the 
backstage and communicative purposes in the frontstage.
4.1   The ideational dimension of IA narratives
Let us rehearse yet again the classic argument (in narrative policy analysis) that ideas – both 
cognitive and normative – serve as the basis for collective action or are deployed to inform, 
reinforce, and potentially reconfigure, the understandings and preferences of policy actors and 
publics (Surel 2000, Schmidt 2008, 2010). How does this ideational dimension fare in relation to the 
classic (for IA) mode of analysis, grounded in economics?
IAs originated as the analytical vehicles through which the economic analyses of competing policy 
options might be debated and communicated. The function of such evidence is to lay bare the logic 
of different courses of policy action and underline the necessity of the one finally recommended. 
But, especially in the EU context, where data cover 27 countries (and in some of our IAs there are 
also significant extra-EU dimensions), it is often impossible to rely on data or robust estimates to 
carry out a full CBA. Recall that the Commission has not selected cost-benefit analysis as main 
criterion, hence we should not expect this to be the overwhelming mode of analysis. Indeed, our
first finding is that narrative and economic modes (including the special case of cost-benefit analysis) 
come out as equally important.
As one might expect, the two tax-related IAs – COMMON TAX BASE and FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
TAX – contained dense amount of quantitative data and deployed the formal economic CBA analysis 
originally envisaged as the analytical basis for all IAs. However, our sample suggests a more varied 
analytical picture than this ‘ideal’. Sixof the studies contain no CBA.Two of the four studies that do 
deploy some economic analyses underline the uncertain nature of some of the data they use 
(MERCURY IA and CYBER IA). The MERCURY IA offers a typical qualifier regarding the epistemic 
uncertainty created by knowledge gaps and time lags ‘… there are two factors that make monetising 
impacts in this way for the EU difficult. Firstly, the real….’ (p15) ...‘…there is little scientific 
information that indicates how further cuts in mercury emissions would translate into, say, reduced 
levels of methylmercury in fish, or over what time period changes could be expected.’ (p15).
The message of these IAs is that the evidence-based policy does not necessarily mean that all IAs 
make bold statements about how certain or decisive is the scientific information. For example, in the 
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CYBER IA, before analysing the policy options it is noted that ‘… trustable data to base the analysis 
on are not readily available’ (p26). The SEALS IA offers another example. It starts with the sentence, 
right in the first paragraph of the Executive Summary:
‘[I]n line with its commitment to high animal welfare standards, the European Commission 
undertook to conduct an objective, in-depth analysis of the animal welfare aspects of seal 
hunting in sealing countries … there are only a limited number of studies …that can be used to 
evaluate with a high degree of certainty the efficacy of the various killing methods…there is 
reported evidence that in practice effective killing does not always happen and some animals are 
killed and skinned in a way, which causes avoidable pain, distress and other forms of suffering 
(p8).
But, then much later in the script the languageis toned down further still, observing that:
‘[P]olicy decisions will have to be taken on limited information. EFSA stated clearly that there 
was a scarcity of robust, scientifically peer reviewed data’ (p45).
In these conditions, it is impossible to rely on quantifiable costs and benefits. Consequently, the 
scripts for the regulation of seal products (and fiveothers) become a qualitative ranking of different 
options (and their possible combinations) against the main objectives of the regulatory intervention.
Thus, even in the face of uncertain cognitive evidence, the majority of our IA sample offered policy 
direction (half of the cases). In the absence of a robust evidence base emphasising the logic of 
necessity, narratives are used to connect the dots and to providenormative foundations for policy 
action, transforming un-conclusive evidence into problems that are amenable to human action. This 
is reflected in the emphasis on the threefold-characterization of IA as concerning economic, social 
and environmental effects of policy. In a way, the IA system of the EU reflects a deep-level 
knowledge belief system. This contrasts with the epistemicfoundations of the US IA which anchored 
the beliefs in the economic analysis of policy where there is no room for the three separate 
considerations of economic, social, and environmental effects.
Cognitive dimensions are nested into deeper-level core norms. For example, we found the core 
norm that integration is not simply about trade and markets, but brings together communities of 
professionals, researchers, and people beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. The norm that 
such coordination‘bring down barriers between countries’ (REF), and should therefore considered to 
be a valued aim in EU-level action, is represented in allof the IAs, to some extent. Text in 
theALZHEIMER IA exemplifies not only the cognitive but normative importance of developing and 
coordinating EU communities of practice:
‘[I]n addition, the main added-value of collaborative health research at Community level is 
obtained from trans-national cooperation, the integration of relevant activities and participants, 
and the concentration of European effort on fewer priorities. In particular, EU health research 
brings down barriers between countries, via multinational consortia and coordination of national 
funding programmes; enforces cooperation between different types of organisations: 
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universities, research centres, hospitals, SMEs, large companies, foundations, or patients' 
organisations. With its increased focus on translating basic discoveries into clinical applications 
(translational research), it also promotes cooperation between scientific disciplines, bringing 
together researchers, engineers, clinicians and industrialists’ (p16, emphasis added)
But, there is a deeper, and fundamentally more political, sense in which normativity enters many of 
the IA texts. The following is a bit of a tautology, but looks like a normative belief that EU action can 
improve on the condition of Alzheimer’s patients. EU action delivers on social benefits ...no matter 
what the costs are! This is exactly the opposite of the classic economic cost-benefit analysis 
argument. Indeed, it is a norm stating that it is ‘good’ or ‘right’ to do something at the EU-level to 
assist patients affected by these conditions. Under the veil of the ‘benefits’ language, we also find 
the norm that EU action has to be valued because it brings in coordination and more efficient use of 
resources:
‘[I]t has been considered that any initiative that improves the situation for Alzheimer’s and 
dementia patients will bring social benefits, such as improving equity of access, support their 
dignity, and help combat stigmatisation. Furthermore, any initiative that promotes coordination 
and supports more efficient use of resources will bring economic benefits’ (p20).
Similarly, in the CYBER ATTACKS and in the COMMON TAX BASE cases, the Commission has no 
problem in bypassing the boundary between technical and political dimensions of policy 
formulation. In the ideal typical account, the IA is triggered and the Commission is engaged with a 
given issue because there is public concern, or a special request by the European Parliament or 
Council. Indeed, this official pathway to IA is exemplified in fiveof our sample. However, in the CYBER 
case, the IA is candid about telling a story in order to increase the credibility of the Commission. 
More precisely, the IA is carried out because it is a way to increase credibility. One would expect the 
Commission to say that the IA is carried out to maximize the weight of evidence in decision-making, 
but:
‘[T]he aim of this initiative is in line with the Commissions' strategic objectives and better 
regulation principles notably to provide effective and efficient measures, ensure a high level of 
legal certainty across the EU, and thus help to strengthen the Community's credibility in the eyes 
of its citizens’ (2009: REF)
Accordingly, political reasoning is used to score the policy options in the CYBER IA. In the COMMON 
TAX BASE the Commission enters directly the pre-negotiating stage by using simulation data to iron 
out all the possible hostile reactions of revenue authorities in the Member States - the proposal was 
developed over more than a decade of studies and pilot exercises. Practically, this IA wants to show 
that the possible negative reaction of country X has already been countered by simulation Y, that the 
effects on revenue do not necessarily harm a given Member States, and so on. This illustrates that 
the IA purpose includes but goes beyond providing the substantive evidence-based support to a 
decision. It may also serve to improve on policy formulation considering a wide range of dimensions, 
18
some evidence-based in the sense of economic analysis, some still in a sense evidence-based, but 
related to expectations about the political reactions to different options made by the Commission. 
Indeed, for the officers at the Commission it makes sense to operate this way instead of bracketing 
the political out of the IA discourse.
4.2 The Interactive dimensions of IA narratives
Turning to the interactive dimension of IA narratives, following Schmidt we distinguish between the 
coordinative and communicative functions of IA narratives, where the former is generated backstage 
in elite discourse and the latter frontstage through dialogue with and to the public (2002: 210-211). 
However, before exploring the evidence of these interactions in our sample, we should first make 
the case that IAs are actually part of an interactive discursive process.
IAs are not simply substantive scripts elaborating the necessity and appropriateness of particular 
courses of policy action. These policy scripts are dynamic and inter-textual. Any single IA belongs to a 
wider ecology of documents. Taken as single text, it does not say anything valuable and its discursive 
significance unclear. But it becomes intelligible, and politically useful, when we read it alongside the 
submissions of pressure groups, the Communications of the Commission, the responses to public 
consultation and so on. To take one example, the SPORT IA refers to documents and initiatives 
(including rulings of the European Court of Justice that establish the informational and political 
background for the assessment and underline the interactivity of the IA process:
‘[I]nformation for the impact assessment on the proposed political initiative is based on in-house  
knowledge (consultations, conferences, expert meetings, working groups) along with existing  
studies (e.g. studies commissioned by DG EAC on sport and education, the Independent 
European Sport Review 2006), reports (e.g. EP reports; EOC, FIA & Herbert Smith report on "Rules of 
the Game") and surveys (e.g. Eurobarometer), which have enabled the Commission to identify 
where the main interests and concerns lie and how to focus possible future actions at EU level. 
It builds on the results of an extensive phase of political cooperation, broad public 
consultation and dialogue on sport at EU level’ (p7).
Four of these policy scripts are also inter-departmental. DGs and the Secretariat General, and Impact 
Assessment Board interact to draft and redraft the IA. So, in the case of the SPORT IA it was 
particularly proud of the ‘strong collegial approach’ which involved no less than 17 DGs in the
preparation and evolution of the document. The ALZHEIMER IA is also instructive in this respect. 
Developed by the Health and Consumers DG in association with the Directorates-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DG EMPL), Research (DG RTD) and Justice, 
Freedom and Security (DG JLS), plus the supervision of the Secretariat General, this is clearly a rich 
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policy formulation network that looks very different from the autonomous baronies of the past. 
Indeed, the IA steering group met formally three times to coordinate on form and content of the 
Alzheimer IA. It follows that a good deal of the ALZHEIMER IA refers the preferences of different 
constituencies (public health, employment, the promotion of research across the EU, fairness and 
rights).
Discursive Coordination at the BackstageNarratives provide a common language for collective 
action for policy construction by elites (Schmidt, 2002: 210). The aim here is to construct consensual 
and coherent narratives about the policy problem, those affected and the way forward. The 
development of a narrative basis for collective action requires actors we categorised as ‘backers’. 
Fiveof our IAs used endorsements of expert groups to underline the credibility of the policy action 
proposed. For example, in the ALZHEIMER IA, the policy elites included a panel of experts on 
Alzheimer disease and dementia, which was convened eight days before the IA was sent to the 
Impact Assessment Board (IAB) for scrutiny. The IA is very transparent on how the panel was used to 
build legitimacy for the IA – and more importantly still to endorse the need for more action at the EU 
level in this field, as shown by the final part of this sentence taken from the IA:
‘[T]he Panel broadly endorsed the impact analysis and options considered by the Commission, whilst also 
providing many references and data that enabled to more clearly define the context of the problem in the 
field of Alzheimer’s disease and dementia, to further develop the option of a platform for voluntary 
cooperation at European level, and to reinforce the impact analysis of Community action in this area’ (2009: 
REF).
The CYBER IA case is goes further still – actually including a one photograph of expert workshops 
convened on the subject which is labelled as ‘consensus development at experts workshop’ (2009: 
REF).
Two further techniques were central in the Commission’s coordination of elite action. The first 
concerns the identification of actors characterised as ‘villains’ – perpetrators of the policy problem –
and how they related to the Commission as policy architect.Five IAs identified actors that can be 
categorised as villains. What is notable here is that the vast majority of the villains were presented 
as actors or forces that did not respect the traditional nation state boundaries – illness and time 
(ALZHEIMERS, 2009); transnational criminal networks (CYBER, 2009; SPORT IA), and non-EU 
countries where seal culling management systems are ‘underdeveloped’ (SEALS, 2008).Thus, with 
these villains to take on the Commission – as supranational entity – becomes the lynchpin in policy 
construction, problem analysis and stakeholder mobilization.
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The second narrative technique used as a rallying call to policy elites concerned the presentation of 
time and creation of policy urgency. In fiveof our IA sample, temporal language or allusions to time 
were deployed to engender a sense that policy action should not be delayed. For example, in the 
CYBER IA: 
‘cyber-attacks have risen to an unprecedented level of sophistication ….ICT infrastructures are 
under constant attack and if Europe does not prepare itself the impact would be much more 
severe’ where the field is marked by a ‘phenomenal growth’ (CYBER IA, 2009: 3).
Similarly, in the COMMON TAX BASE IA tax obstacles are now ‘more and more evident and 
detrimental’ (2011: REF) and the ALZHEIMER IA where the shadow cast by the future increase in 
illness rates and health costs of the ageing population is a theme which is ever present in the text 
(2009).
Discursive communication at the front stage 
As well as enabling the Commission to coordinate policy construction and present itself to its policy 
partners, discursive narratives found in IAs have wider communicative functions. The Commission 
must not simply gather ideas and evidence that go into the problem and policy solution being 
proposed, it must also engender a sense of legitimacy for policy action, and locate it within the 
bigger picture of what that action for the EU project as a whole.In her analysis of the institutional 
dimension of interactive discourse, Schmidt notes that the balance of coordinative and 
communicative discourse is, in part, a function of the institutional make-up of the political system 
being studied. In a multi-actor, highly compound system such as the EU where power is dispersed, 
we would expect coordinative discourse to dominate (2002: 231; 2006). However, the concentration 
on communicative discourse in our sample of IAs was striking. While not using IAs to communicate 
directly with the European public, of course, the Commission uses the IAs as political platforms 
rehearsing the arguments and defence that should be made (by national leaders for example) to 
legitimize its own involvement in the issue at hand as well as the actual substance of the policy being 
proposed.
Our analysis suggested the introduction of drama is key in constructing a sense of legitimacy. 
Dramatic tension is injected in seven of the IA through use of both emotive language in relation to 
who is affected by a problem and what will be lost if no action is taken – these take the form of what 
we term ‘doomsday scenarios’ where the worst case scenarios are either remembered or 
postulated.The SEALS IA is the most emotive of the sample, where these sentient animals are 
framed as the heroes and victims of the IA. Similarly, we are reminded of the ‘stigmatization’ 
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ofvictims of Alzheimers and their carers (p13).The use of the doomsday scenario is found where the 
Commission justifies its proposal for action in the CYBER IA by emphasizing how ‘vital’ that sector is 
for all segments of society evoking the logic of learning from a past ICT security failure, here policy 
action to build ‘the first and most critical line of defence against cyber attacks’ (p20) becomes 
commonsense:
‘Discussions after the Estonian attack suggest that the effects of similar events can be limited by 
preventative measures …..[T]he Commission, fully respecting the subsidiarity principle, is ideally 
placed to coordinate such efforts…’ (ibid., p4).
Similarly, in the ALZHEIMER narrative is dominated by arguments that ‘best practices’ that could be 
shared could be lost and that opportunities to exploit research developments in member states are 
being missed are not currently being shared across the EU and lack of research (p13-14 in particular). 
Without the benefit of ‘coordinated sharing of experience’ the ‘costs in public healthcare provision 
on long-term care in the Member States will increase’ (p20). A similar sense that a window of 
opportunity could be missed is also evoked in the SPORT IA (p21).
The issues considered in the IA are often mundane low politics matters, but they are discursively 
linked to grandiose declarations and solemn texts. This discursive anchorage perhaps brings more 
leverage to the proposal made in the IA, or simply shows the importance for the entire EUof the 
issue being considered. One key technique deployed to give policy a sense of orientation within the 
wider EU project is to link it to previous directives, declarations and Treaties.For example,the 
ALZHEIMERS IA illustrates how legitimacy is intertwined with issues concerning the legal basis for 
intervention and the scope for EU action in areas where prima facie member states seem more 
equipped to solve problems.This IA is a good example of how discourse does not just target the 
stakeholders and the European Parliament, but it tackles directly the objections to EU intervention 
of the member states (or some of them). The Commission acknowledges that:
‘[I]n the field of public health, Community action shall be directed towards the prevention of 
human illness and diseases as well as the improvement of public health in general. The principal 
responsibility for health services and medical care lies with the Member States, and it is thus 
primarily for Member States to respond to the challenge of dementias’ (p14)
However, the IA looks at general-purposes articles to make the case for EU intervention. Specifically, 
it carries on by observing that:
‘… as set out in Article 152 of the Treaty, the Community shall complement national policies, 
encourage cooperation between the Member States, and lend support to their action. There is 
substantial potential for Community added-value in addressing the specific problems set out 
above in order to help ensure effective and efficient recognition, prevention, diagnosis, 
treatment, care, and research for Alzheimer's diseases and other dementias in Europe. As set 
out in Article 165 of the Treaty, the Community and the Member States shall coordinate their 
research and technological development activities to ensure that national policies and 
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Community policy are mutually consistent. In close cooperation with the Member States, the 
Commission may take any useful initiative to promote coordination’. (p14)
The SPORT IA evokes the legal base in a different and necessarily creative way. Faced with no 
competence in the area, this IA is discursively anchored in the need to clarify the Commission’s 
policy scope:
[T]he interaction between sport and EU law as well as the role of sport within EU policies … has 
not been addressed in a comprehensive manner and needs to be illustrated in order to give 
orientation on how to take into account the existing texts at EU level that relate to sport’ (p9).
In some cases, the Commission moves beyond justifying action in legal terms alone.For example, in 
the SEALS IAthe Commission pressed home the idea of policy action as its part of a legal 
commitment to particular animal welfare standards but also as its moral duty both to seals as 
sentient animals and also to an expectant European public noting the ‘high level of public concerns 
regarding animal welfare aspects of seal hunting’ (p6).The SPORT IA offers a similar concern –by not 
becoming involved and pushing a policy forward, the Commission would be guilty of not living up to
its responsibilities and promises to the EU public: which would be detrimental to the image of the 
Commission in meeting its citizens’ expectations’ (p20).
A further narrative tool used in the IAs to seek public legitimacy concerns the use of language that 
assumes common values. All eightof the IAs have some instances where the notion of ‘European 
values’ or ‘European culture’ is evoked. Again, the ALZHEIMER IA is instructive in this regard:
‘Our shared European fundamental values mean that, across the European Union, we have a 
collective responsibility to ensure that people can age with dignity, in good health, and with 
same rights for health and social care as any other population group’ (p5).
To stress this special orientation of the EU towards values may be just ‘cheap talk’ of course 
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982). But, one may reason that the Commission keeps repeating that 
Europeans have shared values in the IAs is to make a rhetorical point that can then be used yet again 
in the future by arguing that ‘as we often said, we have shared European values to which we are all 
committed’. The statement in the ALZHEIMER IA about fundamental values is somewhat striking 
because in the same IA we found the acknowledgement that ‘in Europe, there is no consensual view 
on ethical issues’ (p13).
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The European Commission’s presentation of self 
When the coordinative and communicative narratives techniques are combined, the result is akin to 
the Commission adopting different personae or presentations of self (1959). The European 
Commission, like other organizations performing in a dense environment, engages in the strategic 
presentation of self, and the manipulation of frames. Frank Schimmelfennig (2001) made this claim 
drawing on Goffman (1959) and with reference to the overall behaviour of the EU in the 
international community. Since we are concerned with the European Commission rather than the 
EU, what matters are the co-producers of policy – stakeholders (often business stakeholders), the 
European Parliament and the member states instead of the wider international community – and 
policy audience – member states and European public. Because of this, the Commission’s IA may 
represent the problem as identified by institutions and actors other than the Commission. This way 
problem identification becomes a discursively effective way to present the Commission as 
responsive to its policy partners, other EU institutions and EU citizens. This self-presentation may be 
less or more important than others (such as presenting the Commission as an organisation dedicated 
to evidence-based policy), following Goffman much depends on the ‘definition of the situation’ 
(1959). For the Commission asa performer in a cultural environment to write an IA provides an 
opportunity to strategically suggest a presentation of self as an ‘evidence-led organisation’ (but also, 
depending on the subject matter, as upholder of certain values and beliefs in governance, the 
market and human rights) and to manipulate frames by presenting a certain definition of the policy 
problem. In fact, the first step in the IA is called ‘problem definition’ – this is where the Commission 
has an opportunity to manipulate policy frames. Typically, in the first section of the IAs the 
Commission’s officers can choose among a number of options in terms of defining why a given social 
or economic problem deserves the attention of the EU and why a particular identification of what 
the problem is correct – and other definitions are inappropriate.
In our analysis we found multiple presentations of self. Table 3 summarizes these numerous 
personae adopted by the Commission and illustrates that all cases multiple identities were adopted 
within a single IA. Space constraints prevent us from outlining each of the personae, but rather three 
of the recurrent ones are explored here in more depth.The first was expected and is present in every 
IA: since the IA process is informed by the smart regulation agenda and evidence-based policy ideal, 
the Commission uses the IAs to present itself as an evidence-based organization dedicated to the 
dispassionate scrutiny of empirical evidence to meet the expectations of its European public.
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A variation of this presentation is the calm, responsible, gentle giant– a presentation that is quite 
evident in the COMMON TAX BASE, MERCURY, SEALS AND ALZHEIMER IAs. For example, the 
COMMON TAX BASE IA argues that the Commission took responsibility for direct corporate tax 
coordination at least since the 1992, and lists with pride all the initiatives, studies, and proposals in 
the two decades since that date. The Commission is still committed to evidence-based policy, but 
this commitment is reinforced by a long-standing responsibility as custodian of the single market. 
Given this responsibility, the Commission does not follow the vagaries of political mood. Instead, it 
cumulates evidence for the ‘good cause’, study after study, communication after communication, 
proposal after proposal. Similarly in the MERCURY case, the Commission is conscious of its position 
as a significant exporter or mercury and the consequences of further additions to the ‘global pool’ 
(p15).
But there are also other presentations of self that are lessin line with the evidence-based policy 
agenda. Four IAs shows a diligent, responsive agent, in tune with the expectations of governmental 
and non-governmental actors, as well as citizens.Indeed, in the SPORT IA has a whole section 
entitled ‘a clear political demand’ (Section 3.2.3.1). But, it perhaps in the discussion relating to taking 
the ‘No Action option that this responsive persona is most explicit:
‘N]o action would finally mean not drawing any lesson from the repeated calls by 
governmental and non-governmental actors to better promote sport at EU level, and to raise the 
visibility of the social and economic potentials of sport’ (p22, emphasis added).
Responsive policy, however, is not the same as evidence-based policy. Indeed it is often argued that 
the economic appraisal of options is a way not to fall into the trap of responding to public opinion 
moods that can be misleading. Another example is RECREATIONAL CRAFTS ENGINES IA, where it is 
argued that the identification of the problem as one of improving on emission was made by the 
European Council and the Parliament, who ‘have requested the Commission to report on the 
possibilities of further improving the environmental characteristics of recreational marine engines’ 
(p2). Thus, here the Commission is again a diligent and responsive institutional citizen. Oddly, in the 
same IA it goes further in the presentation of self, showing not only responsiveness, but also the 
motivation to become a leader (comically, in an IA on recreational craft engines’ emissions, which 
cannot be seen as pivotal in reaching major climate change goals!):
[I]n view of the call by Heads of State at the Lahti informal meeting in October 2006 for urgent 
action on climate change and the Commission’s commitment to lead this  policy process, a 
maximum effort should be made to further optimise this reduction potential’ (p25).
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5.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
While previous research has focused on the quality of IA as tools for evidence-based policy and 
smart regulation, in this paper we have explored a different perspective, drawing on the narrative 
policy framework developed by Roe (19941994) and recently improved by Jones and McBeth (2010). 
This framework embraces a social ontology combined with an objective epistemology. The first 
result of our exploration is that there is plenty of empirical evidence that the IAs of the Commission 
have a narrative dimension (see Appendix).  This is not a general feature, however. The Commission 
is a narrator, but not always - future research will have to explore the scope conditions that trigger a 
or hinder a narrative mode. In five cases there is a plot, drama or doomsday scenarios are 
represented in seven of the IAs, heroes or villains appear in six. Two cases seem to stick to a classic 
CBA template though, and a further two engage primarily with economic analysis. One can reason 
that evidence-based policy (or, in a narrower definition, economic analysis) does not exclude the 
narrative dimension. Future projects should consider jointly the two dimensions and establish 
conditions under which one of them is alternative to the other, when they strengthen each other, 
and when they have contradictory effects on the reader and the overall coherence of the IA.
By considering the narrative dimension, we were able to find that the IA is a useful tool to bypass 
the boundary between technical and political appraisal of proposal. We found evidence that the IA 
may usefully address political concerns and enter the pre-negotiation stage so to speak. Given that a 
current theme in the political discussion is about the independence and technical objectivity of the 
IA, our evidence suggests a completely different perspective. Instead of seeking unrealistic aseptic 
'essays', we should reason that this tool may also improve on policy formulation by addressing 
political concerns via empirical analysis and reasoned argumentation. This makes the IA more 
interesting and useful to decision-makers (like the Commissioners) and elected politicians in the 
European Parliament and the Council. Perhaps it makes sense to operate this way instead of 
bracketing the political out of the IA discourse. This with the caveat that the bridge between the 
technical and the pre-negotiating stage should be built around evidence, otherwise the credibility of 
the whole exercise will suffer irremediably. 
We identified one unifying narrative theme in our sample: coordination. Though smart regulators 
are supposed to believe in laboratory federalism, regulatory competition, learning via competition 
and emulation, mutual recognition and diversity, the narratives seem to suggest a preference for the 
concepts of coordination and harmonization. This is what our linguistic-narrative analysis tells us -
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what we are saying is true only in terms of our coding framework, designed to tap into the linguistic, 
dramaturgical, textual components of the IA. Our scorecard was not designed to measure the type 
and quality of economic analysis. Hence, we cannot establish if the Commission insists on 
coordination when, say, regulatory competition is more plausible as solution to a common problem. 
This is an area where classic economic analyses of the IAs could usefully complement our narrative 
perspective.
The Commission may or may not use IA to produce economic analysis of legislation or to stick to 
other standards (such as consultation, problem definition, examination of alternatives to traditional 
regulation) of what is now called smart regulation (European Commission 2011c). To establish this, 
one needs research designs of the type used in the past by evaluators and academics (The 
Evaluation Partnership 2007, Fritsch et al. 2012). But no matter how engaged the Commission is with 
smart regulation, it is certainly engaged with the narrative dimension of IA. The narrative dimension 
is not a monolith, however. it varies in relation to genres. The different narrative techniques are 
deployed quite skilfully by the Commission. The Commission is a talented writer, who can elaborate 
on different genres - specifically, we found the problem-solvinghandbook; the thriller story; the 
manifesto for policy action, and the thematic essay. The less interesting IAs (from a narrative point 
of view) belong to the flat 'homework' genre or the 'revise and resubmit' essay, when the IAB makes 
critical remarks and the main preoccupation of the authors is to show compliance with the IAB 
suggestions rather than engaging with the narrative.
We found that our conjectures regarding the coordinative and communicative dimensions of IAs
were not rejected by empirical evidence. The Commission uses IA to provide a definition of self and 
to establish norms and values. Specifically, our analysis led us to twelvepersonae or presentations of 
self(ves)adopted by the Commission– some within the same IA. In our sample the Commission 
presents itself as the gentle reflexive giant, diligent agent, the responsive organization, and, of 
course, the evidence-based organisation. Thus,the notion of smart regulation based around an 
evidence-based organisation is accurate, but in terms of presentation of self represents only the tip 
of the iceberg. Future research could establish whether the use of IA to present personae and to 
establish norms is a unique feature of the European Commission, or it also affects other producers of 
IA, such as the US federal executive agencies and the UK departments. To do this, one has to extend 
the analysis to samples from countries like the UK and the US.
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The ultimate aim of the paper has been to generate hypotheses. This work is still in progress as we 
explore the implications of the rich data we have. Tentative avenues for hypothesis building include: 
the role of policy types (Lowi 1964); the impact of issue novelty; problem tractability, and the 
existence of pre-constructed target populations.[TO BE EXPANDED AFTER PSA]
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APPENDIX 1: THE FIVE CAUSAL PLOTS
MERCURY
2005
SEALS
2008
CYBER
2009
COMMON TAX BASE 2011 FINANCIAL TRANSACTION 
TAX 2011
The plot is in five parts:
First, mercury causes health 
problems. 
Second, the EU possesses the 
legal  competences to protect 
public health.
Third, although previous 
legislation has tackled many 
aspects, selected problems 
remain underregulated or are 
not covered by current 
legislation at all.
Fourth, action must be taken in 
order to avoid the doomsday 
scenario.
Fifth, forthcoming legislation 
shall cover those aspects.
The plot is in six parts:
First, there is evidence for 
concern among European citizens 
when it comes to the hunting of 
seals. 
Second, these concerns refer to 
killing methods (rather than: 
killing at all, although this 
concern is mentioned as well). 
Third, these concerns are either 
based on information about cruel 
killing methods - or the entire 
lack of information and 
transparency. 
Fourth, if we were to prohibit 
trade entirely we would not 
create any incentive to improve 
on the welfare of animals outside 
Europe.
Fifth, the EU needs to develop 
incentives which encourage less 
cruel killing methods and 
enhance transparency in order to 
make these improvements 
visible. 
Sixth, as the EU is a major market 
for seal products this policy will 
result in worldwise diffusion of 
good practices.
The plot is in six parts:
First, there are discrepancies in the way in which 
member states ensure the security and 
resilience of critical information infrastructures, 
manage incidents, and involve the  private 
sector.. 
Second, there is a general lack of incentives and 
practical capacity for the  private sector to 
invest in security at the level that governments 
would normally demand (market failure).
Third, the low level of protection in some 
member states has the potential to increase the 
vulnerability of others.
Fourth, the lack of systematic cross-border co-
operation substantially reduces the 
effectiveness of countermeasures.
Fifth, we need EU action to bridge gaps in 
national policies, enhance European governance 
for the security and resilience of such 
infrastructures, strengthen Europe’s operational 
incident response capability, and enhance 
internet security and resilience.
Sixth, we are committed to smart regulation and 
the Commission respects the authority of the 
member states. 
Seventh, we therefore do not propose a binding 
document and suggest a non-binding 
framework.
The plot is in five parts:
First, there are 27 different tax 
codes in the EU.
Second, firms operating in an 
integrated business 
environment have to 
disintegrate their tax business 
into 27 regimes which change 
quite often. 
Third, this establishes tax 
barriers to the internal market.
Fourth, most previous EU 
initiatives are legally non-
binding and have so far not led 
to any action at member state 
level. 
Fifth, there are five different 
ways to go about tax reform, 
all of which resulting in welfare 
improvements.
The plot is in four parts:
First, individual member 
states have taken action to 
respond to the financial 
crisis. 
Second, there are, however, 
four problems: market 
distortions due to unilateral 
action, ineffectiveness on a 
domestic level, confusion 
amongst market 
participants, and partial 
unfairness when it comes to 
deciding who carries the 
burden. 
Third, the status quo is 
doomed to fail.
Fourth, we therefore need a 
EU-level solution.
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APPENDIX 2: THE FOUR DRAMATIC IAS
MERCURY2005 SPORT2007 CYBER2009 COMMON TAX BASE 2011
This impact assessment does not 
contain highly dramatic or emotive 
elements yet the danger of mercury 
are clearly spelt out:
“Mercury and its compounds are 
highly toxic to humans, ecosystems 
and wildlife. High doses can be fatal 
to humans, but even relatively low 
doses can have serious adverse 
neurodevelopmental impacts, and 
have recently been linked with 
possible harmful effects on the 
cardiovascular, immune and 
reproductive systems. Mercury is 
persistent and can change in the 
environment into methylmercury, the 
most toxic form. Methylmercury 
readily passes both the placental 
barrier and the blood-brain barrier, 
inhibiting potential mental 
development even before birth. 
Methylmercury collects and 
concentrates especially in the aquatic 
food chain, making populations with 
a high intake of fish and seafood 
particularly vulnerable.” (p5)
This impact assessment 
does not contain highly 
dramatic or emotive 
elements yet the 
dangerous implications of 
the status quo and 
potential future 
challenges are 
emphasised:
“There  are  also  certain  
developments  inherent  
in  the  field  of  sport 
(e.g.  increasing 
commercialisation and 
professionalisation of 
sport, stagnation of 
voluntary engagement in 
sport, emergence of new 
stakeholders in sport 
outside the traditional 
organisational structures, 
increasing recourse to 
litigation) as well as risks
and threats related to sport 
(e.g. trafficking of young 
players, doping, violence, 
racism, corruption).” (p12)
This impact assessment uses many examples of drama, although the language is quite 
even:
“The risks due to man-made attacks, natural disasters or technical failures are 
often not fully understood and/or analysed. Consequently, awareness across 
stakeholders is insufficient to devise adequate safeguards and countermeasures” 
(p3)
“The ICT sector is vital for all segments of society: for the private sector, for 
governments and public administrations and for the citizens.” (p3)
“At the same time, no Member State is an island. The global nature of the Internet, 
which is the most evident example of an interconnected CII, requires a holistic and 
global approach to network and information security. At EU level it is possible and 
necessary to have a direct impact; international cooperation will build on effective 
action at this level.”
“DDoS attacks work by infecting the machines of innocent users with malware that 
gives control to the party who wrote the malware. If the initial distribution of the 
malware is effective in infecting sufficient machines, the result is a global network 
of compromised machines known as a ‘bot-net’ (short for a robot network) that 
can then be used to attack another system. The target system will then find itself 
subject to significant levels of incoming traffic way above anything it is designed to 
cope with under normal operating circumstances. At this point, the target system 
can no longer cope, being unable to differentiate between ‘legitimate’ incoming 
traffic and that generated by zombies. At this point the only solution is often to 
disconnect the system from the public Internet until the attacks stop, denying 
service to legitimate users and zombies alike.” (p74)
This impact assessment 
contains a moderate 
number of examples of 
drama:
“Both these elements are 
indeed perceived as major
tax obstacle by the 
business sector.” (p42)
“In addition, according to 
the European Tax Survey, 
cross-border activities 
have a substantial
influence on the size of 
compliance costs.” (p43)
“Compared to the ‘status 
quo’ scenario, all the 
different policy scenarios 
analysed result in a slight 
improvement of 
aggregate welfare.” (p44)
“The study identified the 
fundamental advantages 
of providing EU 
businesses with a 
common consolidated 
corporate tax base for 
their EU-wide activities.” 
(p53)
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APPENDIX 3: DOOMSDAY SCENARIOS IN SEVEN IAS
MERCURY2005 SPORT2007 SEALS2008 ALZHEIMER2009 CYBER2009 COMMON TAX 
BASE 2011
FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTION TAX 
2011
“The possible 
resumption of 
mercury mining 
and primary 
production in the 
EU would bring 
new mercury into 
circulation, and 
also would 
generate 
emissions at the 
site of
production. If 
production at 
Almadén were on 
average 275 
tonnes per year13, 
then the direct 
emission to air 
would be of the 
order of 2 tonnes 
per year. Surplus 
mercury from the 
chlor-alkali 
industry would be 
recirculated into 
society. The EU 
would remain the 
dominant global 
"Taking no action would have the 
following  consequences: a) Given  the  
strong  calls from stakeholders for  
more  legal clarity,  the Commission 
(...) would miss the opportunity to 
enhance knowledge of the case-law of 
the Community Courts and the 
decisional practice of the Commission, 
in particular as regards the application 
of EU 
internal market rules and competition 
law to sport. Limited understanding of 
the impact of EU law on sport 
increases the risk of decisions taken 
by stakeholders in the field of sport that 
run counter to EU law, and therefore also 
the risk of infringement procedures and  
litigation before the Court. b) The 
opportunity to further address sport 
governance issues and to contribute to 
tackling challenges arising for instance 
from the weak protection of under-aged 
sportspersons as well as from serious 
threats to sport such as doping, violence 
and racism would be missed, with the 
result of a continuation of these harmful 
developments. c) (...)to ignore an 
important concern of both the grassroots 
sport sector and Member State sport 
“If no action is taken 
at Community level, 
seal products will
continue to be placed 
on the EU market 
without any 
reassurance to the 
consumer that the 
animal has been killed 
and skinned without 
causing avoidable 
pain, distress, fear 
and other forms of 
suffering. More EU 
Member States might 
therefore undertake 
individual action in 
response to the 
animal welfare 
concerns expressed 
by many citizens. 
Such a situation will 
lead to a continued 
fragmentation of the 
EC's internal market. 
Without any action at 
Community level, it 
will be difficult to 
ensure that the 
“This option would 
only continue 
current actions in 
the field of 
Alzheimer’s disease 
and dementia that 
are currently in 
progress. As the 
EuroCoDe project 
has now finished, 
this work will now 
stop and will not be 
taken further 
except through calls 
for proposal within 
the scope of the 
current Health 
Programme. 
Current projects 
and proposals 
under the 
Framework 
Programme for 
research would 
continue. 
Moreover, actions 
in the individual 
Member States, 
such as research 
“Nothing too dramatic, 
even toned: ‘The cross-
border nature of the 
problem would 
accentuate the 
differences in security, 
resilience and 
preparedness across 
Europe. The vulnerability 
of CII in Europe would 
remain high and possibly 
rise, despite individual 
efforts.” (p5)
“ICT infrastructures are 
under constant attack 
and, if Europe does not 
duly prepare itself, at all 
levels and by involving 
all stakeholders, the 
impacts from large scale 
attacks might be 
severe.” (p6)
“Without horizontal 
actions  at EU level, 
Member States would 
continue acting 
individually or in the 
“All in all, from 
the general 
economic trends 
pointing to 
increasing 
internationalisati
on of production 
it can be inferred 
that the current 
problems deriving 
from the 
fragmented EU 
landscape when it 
comes to 
corporate 
taxation are likely 
to aggravate in 
the absence of 
policy 
intervention.” 
(p17)
“Non coordinated 
action, planned and 
implemented by each 
Member State on its 
own would aggravate 
the current situation. 
It would further 
contribute to 
distorting the internal 
market for financial 
services, as the cost 
associated to them 
would vary across 
Member States.” 
(p23)
“EU action in the field 
of financial sector 
taxation would 
respect the 
subsidiarity principle, 
because the internal 
market objectives 
pursued cannot be 
achieved by the 
Member States acting 
unilaterally, but can 
only be achieved at 
Union level. Unilateral 
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mercury supplier, 
and the continued 
high level of 
supply would keep 
prices low (and 
possibly reduce 
them further) and 
stimulate demand. 
The likely result 
would be 
increased 
consumption and 
emissions, 
compared to other 
options, although 
this cannot be 
quantified. It 
seems inevitable 
that some of the 
mercury would 
find its way to 
illegal and poorly 
controlled 
applications with 
high
levels of 
emissions.” (p24)
“The EU would 
remain the 
dominant global 
supplier. Hence a 
significant amount 
of the negative 
effects associated 
with global 
mercury use 
described in this 
ExIA would be 
attributable to EU-
authorities. For instance, the 
traditional ways of financing sport at 
national level face challenges that could 
usefully be further studied at EU level 
inter alia to ensure that future EU 
policies, that are likely to impact on the 
financing of grassroots sport can be 
developed while taking full account of a 
sector where information to date is scarce. 
d) Policy makers at national level would 
have to continue to take decisions in the 
field of sport without the availability of 
sound and comparable EU-wide data at  
hand, in the economic field in particular. 
No action would mean to ignore the 
support of EU Sport Ministers for an 
initiative to develop sport satellite 
accounts. (...)e) No action would also 
mean that despite the clearly identified 
need to tackle obesity in a global 
approach and at all levels, the 
important role played by physical 
activity and sport would not receive the 
attention it deserves within EU policies, 
thus reinforcing the risk of an approach 
to fight obesity that puts the emphasis 
mainly on nutrition aspects and less so 
on physical activity, and the ultimate 
consequence of higher levels of obesity. f)  
(...) it would be more difficult to seize the 
opportunity to use the various 
components of the Life-Long-Learning 
Programme to tackle sport-related issues 
and to use sport as a pilot sector in the 
European Qualifications Framework and 
in the European Credit System for 
Vocational Education and Training. 
In case no action is taken, cooperation 
and dialogue in the field of sport 
animal welfare 
aspects the killing and 
skinning of seals can 
effectively be 
addressed and that 
there would be an 
incentive for sealing 
countries to improve 
management 
methods in 
accordance with the 
best practices 
identified during the 
assessment process.” 
(p19)
and establishment 
of national plans, 
would continue. 
This would probably 
include 
development of the 
knowledgebase as 
well as an 
improvement of 
early diagnosis in 
countries with 
comprehensive 
strategies; 
however, in MS 
with no political 
commitment and 
awareness of the 
dementia challenge 
will see little 
progress.” (p18)
“As a result of 
inaction, there will 
be no immediate 
burden on public 
authorities at 
different levels of 
government 
(national, regional, 
local), nor any 
additional funding 
requirements at EU-
level. However, in 
the longer term, 
costs in public 
healthcare 
provision on long-
term care in the 
Member States will 
frame of bilateral or  
limited multilateral 
basis. There would be 
a risk linked to the 
evolution of different  
national  approaches,  
which  might  be  
incompatible.  In  
addition,  cooperation  
across  boundaries 
would be ad hoc and 
may be ineffective due 
to the sophistication 
and scale of  cyber-
attacks. Since Member 
States would continue 
to address these issues 
at different paces, 
stakeholders  might 
refrain from investing in 
security and resilience, 
as the multitude of 
standards and 
obligations would 
decrease their 
competitiveness. The 
cross-border nature of 
the problem  would 
accentuate the 
differences in security, 
resilience and 
preparedness across 
Europe. The  
vulnerability of CII in 
Europe would remain 
high and possibly rise, 
despite individual 
efforts.” (Summary, p5)
action by Member 
States creates the 
internal market 
problem described 
above, it does not 
solve it.” (p24)
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sourced mercury. 
Continuing 
mercury 
production in the 
EU could be taken 
as a sign in other 
countries that 
mercury is not a 
problem that 
needs to be taken 
seriously.” (p33)
would continue within current 
structures and settings, which have 
proved to be unsatisfactory for many 
stakeholders who claim a voice and place 
in their dealings with the EU.” (p20-22)
increase with the 
increasing burden 
of an ageing 
society, without the 
benefit of 
coordinated sharing 
of experience and 
best practice across 
the EU.” (p20)
